GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIES IN THE EARLY YEARS OF THE MEIJI ERA by Horie, Yasuzo
TitleGOVERNMENT INDUSTRIES IN THE EARLY YEARS OFTHE MEIJI ERA
Author(s)Horie, Yasuzo










THE DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS 
IN 
THE IMPERIAL UNIVERSITY OF KYOTO 
VOLUME XIV 
1939 
PuBUSHED BY THE DEPAR.TMENT 
OF EcONOM ICS IN 
THJo: IMPERIAL UNIVEllSITY OF KYOTO 
GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIES IN THE 
EARL Y YEARS OF THE MEI]I ERA 
By Y ASUZO HORIE 
In a treatise published in one of the recent issues of this publica-
tion,* I discussed the economic policies pursued by the Government 
through the medium of the Tsushoshi in the years immediately following 
the Meiji Restoration. and in the course of these observations I made 
the following statement: "The above-mentioned economic policy of the 
Tsushoshi, though an economic policy in name, had to concern itself 
chiefly with commerce and monetary circulation, in conformity with 
the economic conditions prevailing in this country at the time. Such 
a policy hardly sufficed to enable the country to face foreign capitalism 
successfully, while, on the other hand, the Government could not afford 
to await the natural development of modern industrial capitalism in 
Japan without doing anything to help it forward. It, therefore, launched 
a series of measures for industrial development, including the establish-
ment of model factories." The present work concerns itself primarily 
with various industrial enterprises pursued by the Government, particu· 
larly the operation of model factories which constituted the bulk of the 
aforementioned government measures for industrial development. 
I. THE SCOPE OF GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIES 
The industrial enterprises carried on by the Government 
during the early years of Meiji comprised many undertakings 
taken Over from the central and local feudal governments. 
In the mining enterprises, for example, it is found that the 
Government acquired the Ikuno silver mines and the Sado 
gold mines from the former Tokugawa Government, the 
Kosaka and Innai silver mines, the Okuzu and Mayama gold 
mines, the Kamaishi iron mines, the Takashima and Miike 
coal mines and other similar enterprises from the various 
cIan governments. In addition to these there were a number 
of mining enterprises (like the Nakakosaka silver mines) 
* "The Economic Significance of the Meiji Restoration." Kyoto Univ. 
Economic ReView, Vol. XII. No.2. 
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which were expropriated from private owners, and others 
(like the Shimane copper mines) which were newly opened 
by the Government. These latter, however, proved to be of 
minor importance in comparison with the first mentioned 
group of mining enterprises. In the industrial field, the 
dockyards at Yokosuka, Yokohama and Nagasaki were taken 
over from the Tokugawa Government, while Hy6go Dockyard 
(the antecedent of the present Kawasaki Dockyard) was an 
enterprise in which the Kanazawa clan had a controlling 
interest. The Sakai Cotton Mill was purchased from the 
Kagoshima clan, while the Akabane Manufacturing Plant 
operated for the production of various types of machines 
was established with machinery provided chiefly by the Saga 
clan. 
Thus in the early years of the new regime, the govern-
ment enterprises consisted mainly of industries which had 
been acquired from various feudal governments. However, 
since it was considered necessary to expedite the develop-
ment of new industries, the Government found it inadvisable 
to confine its industrial activities to these fields, and accord-
ingly it undertook the orgainzation of many new enterprises. 
As in the case of mining, the Government also inaugurated 
many new undertakings in the field of manufacture. These 
newly inaugurated enterprises comprised such organizations 
as the Yarn Manufacturing Plant of the KObusho (1873), 
the Fukagawa Cement Factory (1875), the Shinagawa Glass 
Factory (1876), the Fukagawa Fire-Brick Manufactory (1877), 
the Tomioka Yarn Factory (1872), the Shimmachi Silk Yarn 
Mill (1875), the Senjii Woollen ManufactorY (1876), the Aichi 
Cotton Spinning Mill (1878), the Hiroshima Cotton Spinning 
Mill (1878), etc_ 
Attempts were also made by the Government to promote 
agricultural and cattle-raising projects by establishing in 
1872 the Naitoshinjuku Experimental Station which conducted 
general experimental work in seedlings and in cattle breeding 
from imported stock, and also in connection with agricultural 
implements. In addition, the Government established the 
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Torika Stock Nursery, the Shimoosa Sheep Pasture, the Mita 
Stock Farm, etc., all of which were devoted to the distribu· 
tion of superior stock and seedlings or the development of 
sheep pasturage. It also attempted to introduce Western 
agricultural tools and implements by establishing the Mita 
Manufactory of Agricultural Implements which engaged in 
the study, manufacture and sale of foreign farm supplies. 
Railroad and telegraphic services may also be included 
among the new government enterprises commenced during 
the period under review. 
In can be seen from the foregoing survey that govern· 
ment activity in industry in these early years of Meiji was 
concerned chiefly with the operation and expansion of enter· 
prises that had been taken over from the central and local 
feudal governments of the Tokugawa period. It was princi· 
pally for military, political, and financial ends that many 
feudal governments had taken mining enterprises into their 
own hands. Their adoption of occidental types of industry 
towards the end of the Tokugawa period was prompted chieflY 
by their military requirements and only in a secondary sense 
by their financial needs. It was by no means anticipated 
that these projects would stimulate the rise of private in· 
dustries Nor did the new Government itself operate these 
enterprises for other purposes at this early stage. However, 
because of the growing need for the general industrialization 
of the country, the Government gradually altered its policy 
of industrial operation, subsequently managing these enter-
prises primarily for the purpose of stimulating a general 
industrial expansion. The next chapter deals with these 
changes which took place in the government policies of 
industrbl management. 
II. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF GOVERNMENT 
INDUSTRIES 
It is beyond dispute that the government policy for in-
dustrial development was determined to a certain extent by 
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the desire to establish model factories as a means of pro-
moting general industrial activity_ Some students go so far 
as to state that even the government railways were operated 
as models for such types of enterprises. According to the 
documentary evidences derived from government sources, the 
principal functions of the Department of Civil Affairs (Mim-
busho-m/lll'li), which was in charge of the state-owned in-
dustries at the very beginning, consisted of the preservation 
of peace and order and the promotion of private industries 
with the purpose of increasing national wealth_ The Depart-
ment of Industrial Affairs (KobushO-I/IIl'lr), which was esta-
blished in October, 1870 and which subsequently took over 
from the Department of Civil Affairs the management of the 
major portion of these government industries, had assigned 
to it as its principal function the promotion of national 
prosperity by developing industrial enterprises. It can be 
inferred from the official duties of these two government 
offices that the purpose of the government enterprises was to 
provide examples of Western modes of industrial operation 
for the benefit of private entrepreneurs. It is noted also 
that in his memorandum submitted in 1883 to the Dajokan 
(7.>:iIic"f-Administrative Council), Takayuki Sasaki, the then 
Minister of Industrial Affairs, stated in part that "the prin-
cipal aim of the Department of Industrial Affairs lies in the 
encouragement of Western style industries among the people 
and not in industrial operations for mercenary ends." This 
evidence seems to show that the government industries were 
operated from the very beginning primarily as model enter-
prises, and that prior to the estahlishment of the Department 
of Home Affairs (NaimushO-f'll1i'lr) in November, 1873, Ihe 
Department of Industrial Affairs was the central government 
agency for moulding industrial policies. 
The question may be raised, however, as to whether the 
reality was in conformity with these industrial policies of 
the Government_ In studying the scope of the government 
industries placed under the control of the Department of 
Industrial Affairs, it can be observed that they covered a 
, 
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very wide range of activities such as mining, railroads, tele-
graphic service. manufacturing industries, etc_ Furthermore, 
the motives prompting the Government to take over their 
ownership were varied_ Some enterprises were taken over 
for the purpose of preventing unemployment among miners 
(e_ go, the Ikuno mines), others for the exclusion of foreign 
capital (as in the case of the Takashima coal mine~) and 
still others for the removal of friction among private entre-
preneurs_ Nevertheless, it is apparent that the ultimate and 
common object for which these mines were placed under 
the immediate management of the Government was the 
utilization of their products for diverse government activities_ 
For the Government minted coins, and operated various 
industries such as shipbuilding, railroads, steel manufactur-
ing, and therefore found it convenient to acquire their raw 
materials and auxiliary supplies with the least possible dif-
ficulty_ As a matter of fact, the Government employed 
many foreign engineers and foreign mining techn ique for the 
operation of these mines and in this respect they had an 
appearance of model enterprises_ Yet it must be admitted 
that this aspect of the enterprises was of only secondary 
importance_ In the field of railway operations, the main 
object of construction was the breaking down of the geo-
graphical barriers that existed in the feudal communities 
which hindered the centralization of authority_ It was pri-
marily for this same purpose that the telegraphic service 
was put into operation under a policy, enunciated as early 
as 1872, which ruled that this enterprise should always 
remain under government ownership_ 
It is apparent, therefore, that the Government placed 
these mining, railway and telegraphic enteprises under its 
direct management mainly for political and military ends, 
there being practically no intention of operating them as 
model enterprises_ As for the mining industry, in particular, 
there was scarcely any departure from the policies and 
methods of operation followed by feudal governments in 
previous years. 
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The Department of Industrial Affairs took over from the 
Department of Civil Affairs many industrial enterprises, the 
Sakai Cotton Mill and the Tomioka Yarn Factory being 
exceptions in this regard. Most of these factories having 
been transferred to the Government from the central and 
local governments of the feudal age, were operated chiefly 
to meet military and political needs. In this respect, they 
resembled the Osaka and Tokyo Arsenals of the Army 
Department, the Ishikawajima Dockyard of the Navy Depart-
ment, and the Mint, which was operated by the Finance 
Department. As a matter of fact, the Yokohama and Y oko· 
suka Dockyards were transferred to the Navy Department 
in 1872 and the Akabane Manufacturing Plant was also 
transferred to the Munition Bureau of that department in 
1883. Among the enterprises inaugurated by the Department 
of Industrial Affairs, the Fukagawa Cement Factory and the 
Fukagawa Fire-Brick Factory produced primarily to meet 
Government requirements. It is of course undeniable that 
most of these factories possessed some of the elements of 
model enterprises or endeavoured to some extent to promote 
industrial expansion. Particularly noteworthy is the case of 
the Akabane Manufacturing Plant which produced a set of 
cotton spinning machines and various types of manufacturing 
machines, and the Government's cement and fire-brick factories 
which were regarded as models for similar private under-
takings. The Yarn Manufacturing Plant of the KobushO and 
the Shinagawa Glass Factory were also established as model 
enterprises. 
In short, the bulk of the industrial undertakings super-
vised by the Department of Industrial Affairs consisted of 
enterprises taken over from the feudal governments and 
operated principally for military and political ends and only 
incidentally to meet the financial requirements of the Govern-
ment. Nevertheless, many of them possessed tbe features of 
model factories to some degree and several of them were 
brought into existence primarily to provide examples for 
private entrepreneurs. While it is undeniable that all of 
----,---------.,-----------~ 
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these undertakings contributed to a greater or less degree 
to the promotion of capitalistic enterprises, in general the 
Government did not expect from these nationalized enter-
prises much more than the obvious financial, military, or 
other direct advantages resulting from their operation_ 
In contrast to these enterprises operated by the Depart-
ment of Industrial Affairs, those managed by the Depart-
ment of Home Affairs were designed primarily to stimulate 
the development of private industrial undertakings_ Es-
tablished in November, 1873, this latter Department took 
over from the Department of Finance the Sakai Cotton Mill 
and the Tomioka Yarn Factory, and subsequently established 
the Shimmachi Silk Yarn Mill, the Senjil Woollen Manufac-
tory, the Aichi Cotton Spinning Mill, the Hiroshima Cotton 
Spinning Mill, the Mita Factory for Agricultural Implements, 
the Mita Stock Farm, the Shimoosa Sheep Pasture, etc. 
During these years the Department was administered by 
Toshimichi Okubo (*A!~~jjm), who provided vigorous leader-
ship in the execution of economic measures in the early 
years of Meiji. He felt keenly the need of government 
leadership and encouragement in securing development of 
new industries and actively carried out his opinions in prac-
tice, with the result that he is often compared by Japanese 
students with Colbert, the famous French mercantilist. He 
was a samurai of the Kagoshima clan, which was one of the 
most active in transplanting Western industries to Japanese 
soil. On the occasion of his visit in 1869 to the Kagoshima 
Cotton Mill operated by his clan government, he became so 
deeply impressed by the efficiency of machine production 
that he considered it a pressing need of his country to 
develop mechanised industries. He became an even more 
enthusiastic advocate of machine industry after his trip to 
Western countries in the years 1871 to 1873, through which 
he acquired an intimate knowledge of industrial activities 
abroad. Subsequent to his return to Japan in 1873, he 
established the Department of Home Affairs to which he 
transferred f!'om the Finance Department the Sakai Cotton 
~~~~~~~~--~- ---------------------------
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Mill, the Tomioka Yarn Factory, and a few other enterprises 
which he had previously supervised as Minister of Finance. 
Furthermore, he established several new manufacturing and 
agricultural enterprises calculated to serve as models for 
private industries. 
As must be apparent from the foregoing survey, there 
were some differences in the nature of the enterprises opera-
ted by the Home Department as compared with those under 
the Department of Industry. Attention should be called in 
this connection to the fact that these differences were coinci-
dent to the differences in the time element. In my opinion, 
it was only after 1873 (the sixth year of Meiji) that the 
government enterprises began to show a definite tendency to 
establish model factories calculated to stimulate industrial 
expansion. It was the year in which the Home Department 
was first organized, and the date at which the Department 
of Industry began to inaugurate most of those enterprises 
which were designed to encourage private undertakings. 
What then is the significance of the change in the nature of 
the government enterprises that appeared at that particular 
period? 
The first factor that contributed to this transition was 
the unification of the country in the guise of a modern State 
by the abolition of the feudal system of government in 1871, 
and by the systematic division .of the country into adminis-
trative prefectures. As a result of the completion of this 
political organization, the Government was free to devote its 
efforts to the development of its industrial policy. In looking 
over the period of radical changes and transitional stages 
that followed the Meiji Restoration, one finds that Japan was 
able to meet this emergency by obtaining a supply of the 
necessary personnel and goods from foreign countries. But 
she was not yet in a position to produce a sufficiently large 
quantity of goods for export in payment for the services 
and goods thus provided. Consequently, all payments had 
to be made out of the country's scanty holdings of gold 
and silver. with the result that there developed an adverse 
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balance of trade and some instability in the monetary system, 
which in turn brought about a sharp advance in commodity 
prices and a drain upon financial capital. Left to take their 
natural course these tendencies 'were extremely likely to 
bring the country face to face with another crisis of political 
chaos and financial collapse. Such a precarious state of 
affairs was not peculiar to the 1873 period for a similar 
condition had prevailed at an earlier date. However, in the 
former crisis the Government had been compelled to center 
all its efforts upon the ach ievement of political unity and 
social stability, and was thus deprived of any opportunity 
to pursue its policy of national industrialization. It was on Iy 
after the achievement of political unification in 1871 that 
. the Government, under the able leadership of Okubo, found 
it possihle to direct its efforts to the establishment of model 
factories for industrial and agricultural enterprises through 
the med ium of the newly organized Department of Home 
Affairs and the Department of Industrial Affairs. It was 
declared explicitly that the purpose that the Home Depart-
ment had in mind in establishing these new enterprises was 
the realization of a favourable balance of trade and the 
prevention of the flight of gold from the country. This 
statement clearly indicates the progress that had already 
been achieved during these early years by the government 
industries in their qualitative aspect. 
The second factor contributing to the change in govern-
ment industrial policies was the need of giving employment 
to many samurai who had been deprived of their occupation 
by the abolition of clan governments in 1871. While they 
were granted allowances for several years subsequent to the 
political reformation, it was feared by the Government that 
they might eventually turn into idlers. Even in the years 
before the abolition of clan government, efforts had been 
made by the new Government to encourage samurai of the 
lower grade to seek employment in some industrial, agricul-
tural or commercial enterprise. With the completion of 
political reorganization, and particularly after the year 1873, 
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the Government made determined efforts to enact various 
measures which would enable the samurai to participate 
generally in productive enterprises. 1873 was the year in 
which the dispute on the question of the invasion of Korea 
divided the Administration into two opposite camps, one 
being led by Takamori Saigo who advocated a war against 
Korea in order to bring relief to the samurai class, and the 
other, headed by Toshimichi Okubo, ~upporting the policy 
of industrial expansion with the same object. In consequence 
of the defeat of the former faction, the Government instituted 
a policy of industrial expansion, building many new model 
factories partly for the purpose of educating the samurai 
and encouraging them to participate in productive industries. 
As noted in the foregoing discussion, government under-
takings inaugurated before 1873 were operated largely for 
military and political reasons, while those established there-
after were designed as model industries calculated to 
stimulate industrial development. It should be pointed out, . 
however, that all the government enterprises were invariably 
operated to some extent at any rate, as a means of increas-
ing the government revenue. During these years the Go-
vernment issued a number of bonds in order to raise the 
funds necessary for carrying out various measures in con-
nection with the abolition of clan governments and the crea-
tion of prefectures, and for advancing to the samurai the 
funds which they required before embarking upon business 
enterprises. The Government also issued new currency notes 
as a means of raising funds. In consequence of these 
measures the Government soon faced the pressing need of 
consolidating its financial position. It was precisely for this 
reason that the revision of the land tax was undertaken in 
1873. In the face of dire necessity, the Government was 
compelled to mobilize its industrial enterprises for fiscal ends 
despite the fact that they were brought into being to fulfil 
a far-sighted scheme for prompting industrial expansion. 
Accordingly, all these enterprises were utilized by the Go-
vernment as means of increasing its revenues. 
---- _._.-_. -- --.~--
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One of the most convenient methods of determining the 
nature of government enterprises is to analyze them in 
connection with the Reserve Account (the ]umbikin-iII'lIil<il.). 
The latter was a special account created in 1869 for the 
liquidation of government notes and debentures by accumu· 
lating such miscellaneous revenues as the sales proceeds 
of discarded articles, etc, After the revision of the rules 
governing its operation in June, 1873, these funds were made 
loanable against payment of interest. These loans were 
roughly classified under three categories, namely, loans to 
government industries, temporary advances to other offices, 
and loans of funds for inaugurating private industrial enter-
prises. The loans of the first category, which are the most 
important for the present discussion, were extended to 
practically all the government industrial enterprises, the total 
amount available before the abolition of the loan funds in 
June, 1880; reaching a sum of some 13,810,000 yen. 
It was most likely that in supervising these enterprises, 
both the Department of Home Affairs and the Department 
of Industry expected to realize returns. If they did, they 
were disappointed. By March, 1890, when this special 
account was closed, these loans were liquidated at 7,874,000 
yen (or about 57% of the total disbursed in loans), the 
remainder being charged to the regular account. This 
failure of the Government to operate these enterpaises on an 
earning basis was one of the principal reasons for their 
subsequent abandonment, a point which will be discussed in 
the following chapter. At any rate, it is an interesting fact 
that while these enterprises developed in line with the policy 
of industrial expansion, they ultimately came to be operated 
for profit· making ends. 
In summarizing the foregoing discussion, it may be 
stated that the various industrial enterprises of the Govern-
ment were characterized in their early stages by military 
and political objectives, to which was subsequently added a 
new element ot response to industrial needs which was to 
become increasingly predominant after 1873. The purpose 
- .. ~----------- --------- ------_._- ----~ 
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underlying this latter policy was the prevention of the outflow 
of gold by obtaining a more favourable balance of foreign 
trade, securing at the same time the benefits derived from 
these industrial activities for the members of the peerage 
(mostly former feudal lords) and for the samurai class. In 
addition, the Government attempted to operate these enter· 
prises for fiscal ends, namely, for the production of profits 
against the use of reserve funds, as a means of improving 
the government's financial position. Thus analyzed, the 
government policy in the operation of these enterprises 
exhibits no essential difference from the ends pursued by 
the feudal governments, for these military, political and 
financial aspects of the government industries were embodied 
in the policies of the old regime as well. There is, however, 
one essential point in which the policy of the new Govern· 
ment differed from that of the old. This will be discussed 
in the fourth chapter. The next chapter will deal with the 
circumstances which led the Government to abandon its 
policy of operating industrial enterprises under its immediate 
control. 
III. THE ABANDONMENT OF GOVERNMENT· 
CONTROLLED INDUSTRIES 
Despite its strenuous efforts in the earlier years to 
operate various industries, the Government announced in 
November, 1880 to the various departments and to the 
Colonization Bureau in the Hokkaido, the newly enacted 
Government Factory Disposition Law with the following 
preamble: "Various factories established by the Government 
for the purpose of encouraging private industries having 
served their original purposes by achieving satisfactory 
progress, should now be relinquished to prh'ate ownership. 
Accordingly each department including the Colonization 
Bureau is hereby requested to dispose gradually of the fac· 
tories under its control or supervision." With the exception 
of those enterprises that claimed military importance, the 
.. _., .. - ... --- .,,---
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government·owned factories and mines were thus transferred 
gradually to private ownership. This change in the govern· 
ment policy of industrial operation is explained from three 
different points of view, which are briefly discussed below. 
The first theory explains the change as follows: .. With 
the return of peace after the Saigo Rebellion in 1877, various 
new systems and projects adopted after Western models 
steadily established themselves, providing eventually for the 
rise of private enterprises. Under these circumstances, 
however, the model factories of the Government by no means 
lost their importance; on the contrary, they began to inter· 
fere seriously with the development of private undertakings, 
thereby compelling the Government to forego their continued 
operation." This theory interprets the Government's an· 
nouncement in connection with the Factory Disposition Law 
previously mentioned in a literal sense. 
The second theory explains the change from a fiscal 
point of view, the following being the theory advanced by 
Mr. Kamekichi Takahashi: .. The causes that led the Govern· 
ment to abandon its policy of industrial operation and of 
paternalistic industrial protectionism were essentially finan· 
ciaL In so far as the initial purpose of producing returns 
for Government investment is concerned, these enterprises 
proved futile often causing substantial losses to the State. 
Moreover, this paternalistic protectionism was accompanied 
by no small amount of favouritism. For these two reasons, 
the public began to demand a laissez-faire industrial policy 
as a corollary of the popular movement for the establishment 
of a National Assembly." This explanation is based upon a 
statement made by Prince Matsukata, who was then in 
charge of the nation's financial affairs, and was therefore 
concerned with the disposition of government enterprises. 
The third theory is one which is advanced by a certain 
group of Marxian students in this country, their argument 
being somewhat as follows; "The significance of this in· 
dustrial reorganization lies in the fact that the Government, 
in its attempt to place under more centralized control its 
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key industries or industries of military importance, which 
supplied the foundation of its existence, gradually transferred 
some of its model industries of minor importance to private 
entrepreneurs. In so doing, however, the Government relin-
quished even some of the industries of military or major 
importance to large capitalistic interests at low prices, with 
the purpose of winning the support of the upper class 
bourgeois and of placing the entire industrial system under 
a more flexible control." This theory is based on the as-
sumption that the Meiji Government came into existence 
primarily as a military and bourgeois authority. 
Of these three theories the first is entirely untenable 
since during the years under consideration private industries 
had not yet reached a state of sufficient maturity to enable 
them to dispense with model factories or to compete with 
government·owned enterprises. The third theory, on the 
other hand. while perhaps correct in its conclusion, lays 
undue emphasis upon the consequences. It fails to explain. 
first of all, why the "military and bourgeois government" 
-which is alleged to have disposed of minor factories to 
private capitalists in its effort to place key industries under 
more dominant control-had endeavoured tirelessly to operate 
less fundamental industries until the promulgation of the 
Factory Disposition Law. In the second place, while it is 
true that the Government placed itself in more intimate 
contact with large bourgeois interests by transferring its 
industrial enterprises to the latter, such transfer or loan of 
government factories (in some cases government factories 
were loaned to private interests as a preliminary step to 
eventual disposal) did not take place until the period 1882 to 
1896, the majority of transfers taking place in 1885-1886, 
when a fever for new enterprises swept the countrY in 
consequence of a successful adjustment of the paper currency 
problem. This makes it most doubtful whether the Govern-
ment really harboured the intention of seeking the co-operation 
of large capitalistic interests at the time of its preparation 
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was the intention of the Government, the theory stilI fails 
to explain why it did not wait to dispose of its enterprises 
until after the stabilization of the monetary system which 
was certain to stimulate the enthusiasm for new undertakings 
on the part of the public. 
I am inclined to support the second theory in view of 
the fact that during these years the Government was absorb· 
ed in the consolidation of its financial position mainly by 
solving its paper currency problem. Financially speaking, 
therefore, the government·owned industries were expected to 
play a part in augmenting public revenues. In so far as its 
industrial policies were concerned, however, the Administra-
tion could not possibly discontinue these enterprises just 
because they failed to bring satisfactory returns. Although 
the only alternative seemed to be the transfer of these 
factories to private operation, there were no private entre-
preneurs who would volunteer to take over their ownership 
for continued operation. Such was the dilemma which the 
Government· was compelled to face. In other words, the 
Government was face to face with the inconsistency of 
maintaining two conflicting industrial policies, namely, the 
policy of profit-making and the policy of encouraging private 
enterprises; and the effort to turn over its industries to 
private interests as the only possible solution proved to be 
futile. This state of affairs was fully described in the report 
submitted by the Department of Industrial Affairs to the 
Dajokan in 1882. 
Another reason that prompted the Government to 
abandon its enterprises was the desire to increase its gold 
holdings. In those years the work of adjusting the paper 
currency problem was making very tardy progress, but the 
plan for the liquidation of government notes had already 
been adopted, calling for an increase of taxes and economy 
in government expenditure as a means of increasing the 
I
I specie on hand. The transfer of government enterprises was 
one of the plans adopted for that same end. In short the 
I removal of the fiscal burden by disposing of unprofitable _~l ______________________________________________ __ 
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undertakings and the application of their proceeds to a 
partial redemption of inconvertible notes were the principal 
considerations that induced the Government to abandon its 
former industrial policies. 
In his enumeration of the fiscal reasons that compelled 
the Government to dispose of its industrial undertakings, 
Mr. Takahashi includes the evils that resulted from the 
favouritism accompanying the paternalistic protection ism 
exercised by the Government. These evils, however, were 
discovered to inhere not so much in the government in· 
dustries themselves as in those private enterprises which 
enjoyed loans from the Reserve Account. Moreover, this 
phase of the situation is less important for the present 
discussion than the pressure of the popular movement for the 
establishment of a National Assembly which was felt by the 
Government to bave a bearing upon its industrial policies. 
The liberal movement which made its appearance about 1883 
reached its climax in 1879-80. The prime movers in this 
political agitation were the members of the samurai class 
who were discontented with various changes and innovations 
introduced by the Government in the political system and in 
the social order generally. Having witnessed the failure of 
the Saigo Rebellion, they were conscious of the futility ot 
armed conflict with the Government, and they accordingly 
sought to dominate the Administration through political 
. channels, launching a movement to demand political parti· 
cipation through parliamentary representation. To mitigate 
this movement and to pacify the discontent of the agitators 
was one of the major tasks of the Administration at that 
time. It was during this period that the Government 
made desperate efforts to provide the samurai with wider 
opportunities and to encourage a further participation in 
industrial activities. It was partly with the same object in 
mind that in 1878 the Government issued industrial bonds 
and invested the funds accruing in many new enterprises 
such as reclamation, railroad construction, the erection of 
cotton mills, etc. These facts clearly show that the Govern· 
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ment's intention in disposing of its industrial enterprises 
was to transfer them to the samurai. 
The above·mentioned contention may be further sub· 
stantiated by recalling the government policy of issuing 
hereditary pension bonds to be granted to the members of 
the peerage (mostly former feudal lords) and to the samurai 
class, in place of fixed stipends, the granting of which had 
been suspended. The issuance of these bonds was authorized 
by the Act of 1876 and the flotation was commenced in the 
following year. With these bonds in lieu of capital, the 
Government allowed the beneficiaries to establish national 
banks. When further grants of charters to national banks 
were suspended in 1879, however, the Government was 
obliged to turn to other sources of investment such as rail· 
roads and marine insurance enterprises on behalf of its 
beneficiaries. Thus the Tokyo Marine Insurance Company, 
established in 1879, and the Japan Railway Company, es· 
tablished in 1881, were organized with the major portion of 
their capital subscribed by members of the nobility. Both 
of these enterprises enjoyed certain special privileges and 
protection accorded them by the Government. The govern· 
ment industrial enterprises under review were generally 
regarded as important investments, and their transfer to 
private owners was prompted largely by the desire to provide 
investment opportunities to private capitalists, particularly 
to members of the nobility and of the samurai class. 
Some of the more enterprising members of these privileg' 
ed classes subsequently emerged into the business world 
as capitalist financiers to whom the Administration offered 
direct and indirect aid in various forms. It is an undeniable 
fact, therefore, that from the very beginning there existed a 
most intimate relation between the Government and these 
capitalists, the nature of which requires careful consideration. 
It has been pointed out that some Marxian students charac· 
terize this relation as a voluntary alliance of authority 
with capitalistic interests. As against this interpretation, I 
contend that this relationship was nothing more -than the 
~--- -----._. 
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Government's effort to provide tutelage to inexperienced 
capitalists. The promotion of capitalistic economy was a 
part of the established policiy of the Meiji Government, in 
pursuance of which members of the privileged classes were 
to be given a part in productive industries. Furthermore, 
the capitalists of those days were not yet in possession of 
sufficient power to dominate government policy. Hence it 
is absurd to ascribe the above·mentioned change in the 
government policies to any active designs on the part of 
the capitalists themselves. 
In summarizing the foregoing discussion, it may be stated 
that the chief factors which compelled the Government to 
abandon its policy of industrial ownership were the financial 
difficulties under which it laboured in those early days. It 
was a natural outcome of this situation, therefore, that these 
enterprises should be operated after 1873 chiefly for revenue 
purposes. In other words, the change in government policy 
was due to the increasing burden upon government finance 
due to the failure of these enterprises to provide the expected 
increment to the Reserve Account. Another reason that led 
the Government to make this move was its desire to provide 
nobles· and samurai with appropriate investments. Finally, 
the rise of the liberalist movement may be said to have 
expedited the Government's relinquishment of its industrial 
enterprises. 
IV. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF GOVERNMENT 
INDUSTRIES 
In the early years of Meiji the Government followed in 
the footsteps of the feudal governments in the management 
of its industrial enterprises, carrying them on with much the 
same scope and methods as had been cl1stomary in the 
previous period. Many of these enterprises represented new 
undertakings upon which clan governments had embarked 
towards the end of the feudal period. The policies under 
which these industries were operated were dominated by 
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military and political considerations coupled with a certain 
effort to satisfy fiscal requirements. But there was practi· 
cally no intention on the part of the Government to utilize 
these enterprises as means of stimulating industrial expan· 
sion per se. After the Restoration, however, they were no 
longer allowed to remain in their former status, acquiring 
steadily thereafter the characteristics of model factories 
designed to promote the general industrial development of 
the country. As a consequence, these characteristics tended 
to become more dominant in shaping the Government's 
industrial policies. Th is transition was prompted partly by 
the necessity of developing capitalistic economy within the 
country in order to avoid the danger of colonization by 
imperialistic powers, and partly by the need of finding 
employment for former feudal lords and samurai who had 
been deprived of their occupation in consequence of the reo 
orgainzation of the country on the lines of a modern State. 
To promote the industrial expansion of the country, 
therefore, the Government has undertaken various projects 
since the establishment of the Tsushoshi in 1869, such as 
the measures to enhance the economic status of the masses, 
the encouragement of corporate enterprises, the establishment 
of exchange companies and other trading organizations. 
These measures which were necessarily confined to the 
commercial and financial fields, were in themselves hardly 
sufficient to compete with the encroachments of foreign 
capitalism. It was under these circumstances that the new 
industrial policy was put into active . operation. Under this 
new policy the government industries were designed in part 
to educate private entrepreneurs by introducing new techni· 
ques of production and management. This new development 
was a natural consequence of the Restoration, which, as a 
democratic revolution, included in its general program the 
economic welfare of the common people. 
As for the second factor, namely, the necessity of giving 
the samurai employment in productive industries, one can 
readily realize that the need which had been felt ever since 
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the first stage of the Restoration, would become even more 
pressing after the abolition of clan governments. It was 
after this political reorganization, therefore, that the govern-
ment industries began to acquire th·e characteristics of model 
industries. The training of the samurai as active participants 
in productive industries was conducted as a part of the 
program for the improvement of the economic position of the 
common people. In view of the fact that the political leaders 
of that period took occasion to praise the samurai for their 
enterprise and aggressiveness, it is clear that the Govern· 
ment anticipated the successful outcome of their efforts. 
Despite the institution of this new industrial policy, 
however, the difficulties in financial management involved 
compelled the Government to operate these enterprises not 
only for military, political and industrial ends, but also 
as profit·earning undertakings. It would perhaps be more 
correct to say that as a result of financial difficulties, the 
Government began to regard the state·owned industries as 
a means of bringing in returns for the investment of reserve 
funds. According to Prince Matsukata, the government 
policy for the operation of these industries was an attempt 
to kill two birds with one stone, namely, to encourage the 
development of private industries and to secure government 
revenues in the form of operating profits. These govern· 
ment policies, therefore, differed but little from those adopted 
by the clan governments which expected to improve their 
financial position by the operation of industrial enterprises. 
In one respect, however, the policy of the new Government 
showed a marked divergence from the policies of the old 
regIme. This was a conspicuous absence under the new 
Government of any attempts to operate its industries in 
competition with private undertakings. 
In discussing the various features of the government· 
owned industries, one can find two important elements which 
pertain to the formative processes of a capitalistic economy. 
One of them is the role played by the government industries 
as model enterprises calculated to promote industrial expan-
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sion, while the other is their fiscal function as profit-earning 
undertakings. These two aspects, however, were seen to be 
entirely incompatible. One or other of these features would 
have to be discarded sooner or later. But for the Govern-
ment that had emerged from a democratic revolution it was 
quite impossible to discard the first element, particularly in 
view of the fact that the Meiji Restoration had been brougbt 
about by the military class. In order to provide relief to 
the samurai the Government, therefore, adhered to the policy 
of industrial expansion so as to be in a position to offer 
these people suitable enterprises in which they could invest 
the pension bonds granted them in I ieu of regular stipends. 
Consequently, the second feature had to be abandoned. This 
then is the true reason for the final abandonment of govern-
ment ownership of these enterprises. 
In summarizing the foregoing discussion, it would seem 
significant that the government industries of these early Meiji 
years represented both an intensive and an extensive expan· 
sion of the new industries recently inaugurated by the clan 
governments. Especially significant perhaps was the fact 
that in both the expansion and the abandonment of these 
industries, the first and the most important consideration 
influencing the Government was the matter of training and 
aiding private capitalists, a group which comprised most of 
the feudal lords and warriors of the earlier regime. We 
conclude then by pointing out the very interesting fact that 
these very government industries became a sort of hothouse 
in which the growth of capitalistic industries was encouraged, 
thereby playing a most important part in the development 
of a capitalistic economy in this country. 
